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SECTION 365 VERSUS 362: APPLYING THE AUTOMATIC
STAY TO PREVENT UNILATERAL TERMINATION
IN A BANKRUPTCY SETTING
ROBERT J. VER GA
INTRODUCTION
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978' governs the rights
of parties to executory contracts after one of the parties becomes a debtor
in a bankruptcy proceeding.2 Generally, section 365 attempts to balance
the bankruptcy policy objective of achieving a successful reorganization'
against a nondebtor's4 right to receive the benefit of its original contrac-
tual bargain.' In particular, section 365(a) enables a debtor to assume or
reject any executory contract.6 Section 365(c), however, provides some
1. Act of November 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code or the
Code].
2. See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 365.01-.03 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter Collier 15th ed.]; see also Government Nat'l Mortgage Corp v. Adana Mort-
gage Bankers, Inc. (In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc.), 12 B.R. 977, 983 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1980) (section 365 applicable to Government National Mortgage Association's at-
tempt to terminate certain guaranty agreements between itself and debtor-mortgage
banker).
Although § 365 also governs unexpired leases, the main thrust of this Note deals with
executory contracts.
3. The goals of the Bankruptcy Code include rehabilitation of the debtor and the
orderly and equitable distribution the debtor's assets. See H.IL Rep. No. 595, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179-80. Underpin-
ning the goal of rehabilitation is the premise that greater economic and social value can
be achieved by employing assets in the industries for which they were designed as op-
posed to liquidating them for scrap. See id. at 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6179 ("It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it pre-
serves jobs and assets."); see also Raymond T. Nimmer, Executory Contracts in Bank-
ruptcy: Protecting the Fundamental Terms of the Bargain, 54 U. Colo. L. Rev. 507, 509
(1983) (the goal of rehabilitation stems from the premise of providing a debtor with a
"fresh start") (citing H.R. Rep. No. 595, supra at 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S.CC.A.N. at
6179).
4. The term "nondebtor" in this Note is a general term designed to encompass both
creditors and other parties to a contract who may not be considered creditors in the
traditional sense.
5. See I Collier Bankruptcy Manual 365.01, at 365-1 to 365-2 (Lawrence P. King
ed., 1992); see also Nimmer, supra note 3, at 522 (the bankruptcy goals of optimal distri-
bution and rehabilitation must be balanced against the general contract law goals of facil-
itating and reinforcing contract activity). Moreover, Professor Nimmer points out that
courts should be cognizant of the ramifications of their holdings on contractual relations
with "financially distressed" entities who have not yet filed for bankruptcy protection.
See 1L at 538-44. He argues that the provision of § 365 that prohibits ipsofacto or bank-
ruptcy termination clauses may limit access of financially distressed debtors to contracts
ordinarily available in a nonbankruptcy setting. See id.; see also Don Fogel, Executory
Contracts and Unexpired Leases in the Bankruptcy Code, 64 Minn. L. Rev. 341, 347
(1980) (parties often add ipsofacto clauses to their contractual arrangements in order to
protect themselves in case of a bankruptcy).
6. Section 365(a) states in pertinent part as follows:
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protection for a nondebtor by prohibiting the debtor from assuming or
assigning those contracts, without the nondebtor's consent, that are non-
assignable under applicable law.7 Section 365(c) also prevents a debtor
from assuming or assigning credit contracts or contracts to provide "fl-
[T]he trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any execu-
tory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988).
Although Congress acknowledged that no single precise definition of an executory con-
tract exists, the House Report submitted with the Code generally describes an executory
contract as one "on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides." H.R.
Rep. No. 595, supra note 3, at 347, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6303. This "re-
maining performance" definition has been applied to many types of contracts. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6 (1984) (collective bargaining agreement); Gill v.
Easebe Enters. (In re Easebe Enters.), 900 F.2d 1417, 1419 (9th Cir. 1990) (option to
purchase real property); Tonry v. Hebert (In re Tonry), 724 F.2d 467, 468 (5th Cir. 1984)
(attorney's contingent fee contract).
Professor Countryman, however, rejected this liberal definition for bankruptcy pur-
poses and defined an executory contract as one in which "the obligation of both the
bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of
either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the perform-
ance of the other." Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57
Minn L. Rev. 439, 460 (1973). This "material breach" test has been applied by various
circuit courts. See, e.g., Terrell v. Albaugh (In re Terrell), 892 F.2d 469, 471-72 (6th Cir.
1989) (land sale contract); Griffel v. Murphy (In re Wegner), 839 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir.
1988) (contract for sale and purchase of personal property); Speck v. First Nat'l Bank (In
re Speck), 798 F.2d 279, 279-80 (8th Cir. 1986) (contract for sale of real property);
Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finish-
ers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1045-46 (4th Cir. 1985) (technology licensing agreement), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1057-58 (1986); Collingwood Grain, Inc. v. Coast Trading Co. (In re
Coast Trading Co.), 744 F.2d 686, 692-95 (9th Cir. 1984) (contract to provide grain
shipments); Benevides v. Alexander (In re Alexander), 670 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1982)
(contract for sale of real property); Fenix Cattle Co. v. Silver (In re Select-A-Seat Corp.),
625 F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (licensing agreement).
A minority of courts have declined to limit themselves to one specific definition of an
executory contract and instead have applied a "functional" test that seeks to further
bankruptcy policy objectives. See, e.g., Chattanooga Memorial Park v. Still (In re Jolly),
574 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir.) (proper approach "to deciphering the meaning of the execu-
tory contract rejection provisions, is to work backward, proceeding from an examination
of the purposes rejection is expected to accomplish"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978);
Camp v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re Government Sees. Corp.), 101 B.R. 343, 348
n.2, 348-49 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (same), aff'd, 111 B.R. 1007 (S.D. Fla. 1990); In re
G-N Partners, 48 B.R. 462, 465-66 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (contract was not executory
if "a rejection by the trustee would neither add to nor detract from the estate's benefits or
liabilities") (quoting Jenson v. Continental Fin. Corp., 591 F.2d 477, 481 n.5 (8th Cir.
1979)). For a brief discussion of this definition and examples of other cases that have
employed this test, see Lawrence J. La Sala, Note, Partner Bankruptcy and Partnership
Dissolution: Protecting the Terms of the Contract and Ensuring Predictability, 59 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 619, 624-25 n.30 (1991).
For the purposes of this Note the author assumes that a contract is executory pursuant
to any of the applicable definitions.
7. Section 365(c) provides in pertinent part as follows:
The trustee may not assume or assign an executory contract.., of the debtor,
whether or not such contract ... prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or
delegation of duties, if-
(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract
... from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity
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nancial accommodations" for the benefit of the debtor.'
In addition to the interaction between sections 365(a) and (c), section
365(e) also balances the competing interests inherent in a bankruptcy set-
ting. Section 365(e)(1) aims to protect the debtor by explicitly prohibit-
ing ipso facto or bankruptcy termination clauses.1" These clauses call
for the modification or termination of a contract upon the filing of a
bankruptcy petition."' Section 365(e)(2)(A), however, provides an excep-
tion to this prohibition in cases where applicable law excuses the
nondebtor from accepting performance from a trustee or assignee of the
contract.12 Further, in precisely the same language used in section
other than the debtor or the debtor in possession, whether or not such contract
... prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and
(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment; or
(2) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or
financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor ....
11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (1988).
Considering the amorphous nature of the term "applicable law," courts disagree over
the scope of this exception to the general power of a debtor to assume or reject any
executory contract See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
8. See supra note 7. Unlike (1)- which allows assumption or assignment upon the
consent of the nondebtor- (2) makes no reference to the consent of the nondebtor.
While some courts believe this omission is inadvertent, others believe it is by design. For
a discussion of the differing viewpoints, see infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
9. The term "ipso facto" means "by the fact itself" or "by the mere effect of an act
or fact." Black's Law Dictionary 828 (6th ed. 1990). Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
"ipso facto" clauses were enforceable. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(b), 30
Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978).
10. Section 365(e)(1) states in pertinent part as follows:
Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract... or in applicable law,
an executory contract... of the debtor may not be terminated or modified, and
any right or obligation under such contract... may not be terminated or modi-
fied, at any time after the commencement of the case solely because of a provi-
sion in such contract... that is conditioned on-
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the
closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this
title or a custodian before such commencement.
11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1988).
11. For a detailed discussion on the historical interpretations of ipsofacto clauses, see
Robert L. Ruben, Note, Legislative and Judicial Confusion Concerning Executory Con-
tracts in Bankruptcy, 89 Dick. L. Rev. 1029, 1037-42 (1984).
12. Section 365(e)(2) states in pertinent part as follows:
Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to an executory contract... of
the debtor, whether or not such contract... prohibits or restricts assignment of
rights or delegation of duties, if-
(A)(i) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract
... from accepting performance from or rendering performance to the trustee
or to an assignee of such contract... whether or not such contract... prohibits
or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and
(ii) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment; or
(B) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing
or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or to issue a
security of the debtor.
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365(c)(2), section 365(e)(2)(B) exempts credit contracts and other con-
tracts to extend financial accommodations from the purview of section
365(e)(1). 1 3
When one or more of the foregoing exceptions to section 365(a) ap-
plies, the focus shifts to the automatic stay provision of section 362. That
is, must a nondebtor seek relief from the stay before terminating a con-
tract that it believes is governed by section 365(c) or (e)(2)? Section
362(a) provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay
against any act to obtain possession of, or control over, property of the
estate.1 4 Debtors contend that even if a contract is arguably nonassum-
able or nonassignable under section 365(c) or (e)(2), the automatic stay
precludes a nondebtor from unilaterally terminating the contract. They
claim that before walking away from the contract a nondebtor must first
obtain relief from the automatic stay. Nondebtors, however, maintain
that the applicability of either section 365(c) or (e)(2) renders a contract
nonassumable and nonassignable as a matter of law. Consequently, they
argue that court approval is not a prerequisite for terminating the
contract.
This Note takes the position that the automatic stay should be invoked
to prevent unilateral termination by a nondebtor even if the contract ar-
guably falls within the scope of section 365(c) or (e)(2). This solution
best comports with the goals of the Bankruptcy Code in general, and
section 365 in particular.
Part I provides background information on sections 365 and 362. This
Part also discusses section 541-property of the estate-and its interrela-
tionship with section 362. Given this framework, Part II examines the
current disagreement over the applicability of the automatic stay to exec-
utory contracts that arguably fall within the purview of section 365(c) or
(e)(2). Part III synthesizes legislative intent, statutory interpretation,
and public policy to support the conclusion that a nondebtor must first
seek relief from the stay before terminating these contracts.
I. BACKGROUND: SECTIONS 365, 362, AND 541
A. Section 365: Balancing a Debtor's Right to Assume or Reject
Against a Nondebtor's Right to Receive the Benefit of Its Bargain
1. Section 365(a): Debtor's Right to Assume or Reject
Section 365(a) of the Code provides that a trustee1 5 or debtor in pos-
11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2) (1988).
13. See id.
14. Section 362(a) provides in pertinent part as follows:
[A] petition filed ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the
estate or to exercise control over property of the estate ....
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
15. In Chapter 11 reorganization cases, § 1104(a) provides that the court may ap-
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session" may, with the court's approval, assume or reject any executory
contract. 7 This section is designed to assist a debtor's rehabilitation ef-
fort by allowing a debtor to reject contracts that are burdensome to the
estate while assuming those that are more favorable."8 Consequently,
section 365(a) provides the debtor with a powerful rehabilitation de-
vice," which, in turn, promotes a primary goal of the Bankruptcy
Code.' Section 365(a) is particularly powerful in reorganization cases
point a trustee upon the request of a party in interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988); see
also H.R. Rep. No. 595, supra note 3, at 402, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6358
("The court may order appointment only if the protection afforded by a trustee is needed
and the costs and expenses of a trustee would not be disproportionately higher than the
value of the protection afforded.").
16. Although the language of § 365(a) refers to the trustee, a debtor will often con-
tinue to manage the affairs of his estate after a bankruptcy filing. See Collier Bankruptcy
Code, § 1104 comment, at 585-86 (Asa S. Hertzog & Lawrence P. King eds., 1990-1991).
In these instances the debtor becomes known as the "debtor in possession." See id
§ 1101 comment, at 572; see also 2 Collier Bankruptcy Manual, supra note 5, 1101.02,
at 1102 (the debtor is a "debtor in possession" until the court appoints a trustee). Section
1107(a) of the Code provides that the debtor in possession generally has all the same
rights and powers as a trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988); see also United States
Dep't of the Air Force v. Carolina Parachute Corp., 907 F.2d 1469, 1472 n.4 (4th Cir.
1990) (section 1107(a) authorizes the debtor in possession to exercise the same power as a
trustee with regard to assumption or rejection of executory contracts); In re Hardie, 100
B.R 284, 285 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989) ("[D]ebtor in possession has the same right to
assume or reject under section 365 as the trustee."); In re Harms, 10 B.R. 817, 822
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) ("Since the debtor-in-possession stands in the shoes of the
trustee.... [h]e is, then, for all interests and purposes, the equivalent of a trustee ap-
pointed by the court."); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5902 ("This section places a debtor in possession in the shoes of
a trustee in every way."). Because the issue of assumption or rejection of an executory
contract is so prevalent in Chapter 11 reorganization cases, this Note will generally use
the term "debtor in possession" or "debtor" rather than "trustee."
17. See supra note 6.
18. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, supra note 3, at 347, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6303-04; 1 Collier Bankruptcy Manual, supra note 5, 365.01, at 365-1; Benjamin Wein-
traub & Alan N. Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts." What is an Executory Contract?
A Challenge to the Countryman Test, 15 UCC L.J. 273, 273 (1983) (citing Countryman,
supra note 6, at 450); see also Nimmer, supra note 3, at 513 ("Section 365 is an integral
facet of the bankrupt's ability to restructure its business operations into an economically
viable format.").
19. See In re Hardie, 100 B.R. 284, 285 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989); In re Compass Van
& Storage Corp., 65 B.R. 1007, 1010 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); In re G-N Partners, 48
B.R 462, 465 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); In re Norquist, 43 B.R. 224, 225 (Bankr. E.D.
Wash. 1984); see also Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1310
(5th Cir. 1985) (the section makes it more likely for a debtor to rehabilitate by "forc[ing]
others to continue to do business with it when the bankruptcy filing might otherwise
make them reluctant to do so"); In re Sun City Investments, Inc., 89 B.R. 245, 248
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (the right of a debtor in possession "to reject certain contracts is
fundamental to the bankruptcy system and provides a mechanism through which severe
financial burdens may be lifted while the debtor attempts reorganization"); Howard C.
Buschman III, Benefits and Burdens: Post-Petition Performance of Unassumed Executory
Contracts, 5 Bankr. Dev. J. 341, 346 (1988) ("A debtor-in-possession's ability to continue
to perform and to compel performance with respect to assumable executory contracts is
usually the life-blood of its reorganization.").
20. See supra note 3.
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where it enables a debtor in possession to assume or reject an executory
contract at any time prior to the confirmation of the reorganization
plan.2 Moreover, pursuant to section 1123(b)(2), executory contracts
may be assumed, rejected, or assigned in a plan of reorganization.22
Although there are no formal requirements for approving a debtor's
decision to assume or reject a particular contract, 23 courts generally ad-
here to a business judgment standard.24 In cases in which there has been
a pre-petition default, the debtor may not assume the executory contract
unless it "cures ' 25 or provides "adequate assurance" 26 that it will cure
the default, and provides adequate assurance of future performance
under the contract.27 If the debtor in possession chooses to reject the
executory contract, any claim the nondebtor may have becomes an un-
secured pre-petition claim.2 s
2. Section 365(c): Exception to a Debtor's Right to
Assume or Reject
While section 365(a) grants a debtor in possession broad power to as-
sume or reject any executory contract, section 365(c) carves out an ex-
ception to this power.29 Recognizing that a bankruptcy filing alters the
relationship between the contracting parties, section 365(c) attempts to
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1988). In Chapter 7 liquidation cases, however, the
trustee has only sixty days from the order for relief to assume or reject an executory
contract. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (1988). The different treatment reflects Congress'
intent to provide more flexibility for a debtor in possession who is planning to reorganize
than for a trustee who is merely attempting to liquidate assets. See NLRB v. Bildisco,
465 U.S. 513, 529 (1984).
22. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1988).
23. See In re Great Northwest Recreation Ctr., Inc., 74 B.R. 846, 856 (Bankr. D.
Mont. 1987); In re Lionel Corp., 29 B.R. 694, 696 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Coast
Trading Co., 26 B.R. 737, 741 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982).
24. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 39 (3d
Cir. 1989); Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1309 (5th Cir.
1985); Carey v. Mobile Oil Corp. (In re Tilco, Inc.), 558 F.2d 1369, 1372-73 (10th Cir.
1977); In re Patterson, 119 B.R. 59, 60 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); In re J.M. Fields, Inc., 26
B.R. 852, 856 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir.
1985) (honoring a debtor's decision unless the decision is so unreasonable that it could
not be based on sound business judgment, but only on bad faith or whim), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
25. See Elliott v. Four Seasons Properties (In re Frontier Properties), 979 F.2d 1358,
1365 (9th Cir. 1992); Citizens and Southern Nat'l Bank v. Thomas B. Hamilton Co. (In
re Thomas B. Hamilton Co.), 969 F.2d 1013, 1021 (11 th Cir. 1992); Transamerica Com-
mercial Fin. Corp. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Sun Runner Marine, Inc.), 945 F.2d 1089,
1091 (9th Cir. 1991); Post v. Sigel & Co. (In re Sigel & Co.), 923 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir.
1991); Secretary of the Army v. Terrace Apartments, Ltd. (In re Terrace Apartments,
Ltd.), 107 B.R. 382, 384 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989).
26. See cases cited supra note 25.
27. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (1988).
28. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (1988).
29. See S. Rep. No. 989, supra note 16, at 58-59, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5844-45.
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provide some protection for nondebtors.3 ° Essentially it allows a
nondebtor to reevaluate the contract based on the new circumstances
that surround the relationship.3'
Section 365(c)(1) provides that the debtor may not assume an execu-
tory contract without the nondebtor's consent if the contract is nonas-
signable under applicable law.32 Although Congress has defined the
amorphous term "applicable law" to mean "applicable nonbankruptcy
law,",33 this definition remains vague. Consequently, courts are divided
over the appropriate scope to be accorded to section 365(c)(1). 4 Some
courts subscribe to the view that section 365(c)(1) should be construed
narrowly and applied solely to nondelegable, personal service contracts.35
30. This prohibition against assumption or assignment attempts to ensure that the
nondebtor receives at least the most critical elements of his original bargain. See Nim.
mer, supra note 3, at 537.
31. See id. Section 365(c) is designed to protect the nondebtor from being forced to
accept performance from an entity other than the one with whom it originally contracted.
This protection is most relevant when the particular identity of a party is a critical ele-
ment of the underlying contract. See id at 544.
Certain contracts are premised on the expectation that specific persons will render per-
formance. In these circumstances, a nondebtor should not have to accept performance
from a third party assignee. See, eg., I Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 23.08.70,
at 19 (William L. Norton, Jr. ed., 1991) (with regard to a contract with a renowned artist
for the production of a specific painting, nondebtor need not accept performance from an
assignee).
32. See supra note 7. This exception applies only when applicable law excuses the
nondebtor from performance regardless of any restrictive language in the contract itself.
See H.R. Rep. No. 595, supra note 3, at 348, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6304; S.
Rep. No. 989, supra note 16, at 59, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5845.
33. See H.R. Rep. No 595, supra note 3, at 348, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6304; S. Rep. No. 989, supra note 16, at 59, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5845.
34. Underlying the holdings in these cases is an inherent balance between the right of
the debtors to assume those contracts that are beneficial to their reorganization and the
right of the nondebtors to receive the benefit of the original bargain. See Nimmer, supra
note 3, at 522; see also In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 981-82 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1990) ("[I]t is a balancing of the estate's right to determine whether to assume or
reject its executory contracts against the rights of the nondebtor parties to those execu-
tory contracts that is at the heart of I 1 U.S.C. § 365(c) and (e)(2).").
35. Personal service contracts involve an exchange of "special knowledge, judgment,
taste, skill, or ability" and are nonassignable by the party under obligation to perform
such service without the consent of the other party. 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 32 (1975 &
Supp. 1992). This type of contract is an exception to the general rule of assignability of
contracts. See John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts §§ 18-28, at
760 (3d ed. 1987); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 318, cmt. c, illus. 5 (1981). Com-
pare In re Noonan, 17 B.R. 793, 798 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (debtor's recording contract
with Arista Records was nonassignable personal service contract) and Foster v. Calla-
ghan & Co., 248 F. 944, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (contract between author and publisher was
a personal service contract that could not be assigned by one party without the other's
consent) and Paige v. Faure, 127 N.E. 898, 899 (N.Y. 1920) (contract which involved
"personal trust" and "confidence" among the parties is nonassignable) with In re
Rooster, Inc., 100 B.R. 228, 233-34 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (nondebtor's control and veto
power over debtor's performance under the contract conclusively cuts against labeling
this contract as one for personal services) and In re Bronx-Westchester Mack Corp., 20
B.R 139, 143 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (fact that debtor purchased distributorship from
third party shows that contract was not contingent on personal services) and Sentry
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This line of reasoning is based primarily on a theory of statutory con-
struction and legislative intent underpinning the Bankruptcy Code.36
Another series of cases, however, rejects the narrow construction applied
Data, Inc. v. Control Data Corp. (In re Sentry Data, Inc.), 87 B.R. 943, 949 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1988) (unambiguous contract that made no mention of unassignable special
duties did not qualify as a personal services contract). See generally In re Fastrax, Inc.,
129 B.R. 274, 278 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) ("[T]he determination of whether a contract
is personal depends on the nature and subject matter of the contract, the circumstances
surrounding the contract, and the intention of the parties.").
There are many cases that narrowly construe the scope of § 365(c)(1) to nondelegable
personal service contracts. See, e.g., In re Sunrise Restaurants, Inc., 135 BR. 149, 153
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that a franchise agreement which did not require "spe-
cial knowledge" was assumable and assignable by debtor in possession); In re Tom
Stimus Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 134 B.R. 676, 679 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (franchise
agreement that is not a "personal service contract based on special trust and confidence"
may be assigned by debtor even though it is terminable under applicable Florida statutes);
In re Fastrax, Inc., 129 B.R. at 278 (subcontract that was not "dependent on any special
personal relationship," could be assigned to another computer software company); In re
Ontario Locomotive & Indus. Railway Supplies (U.S.) Inc., 126 B.R. 146, 148 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1991) (government Anti-Assignment Act did not preclude debtor from assum-
ing contract that did not call for "personal" and "non-delegable" duties); Secretary of the
Army v. Terrace Apartments, Ltd. (In re Terrace Apartments, Ltd.), 107 B.R. 382, 384
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (since exception in § 365(c) is limited to contracts that are de-
pendent upon a "special relationship, special knowledge, special skill, or talent," the
debtor may assume executory lease notwithstanding federal statute to the contrary); see
also I Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice, supra note 31, § 23.08.70 at 19 (supporting
the line of cases that limit the scope of § 365(c)(1) to nondelegable personal service
contracts).
36. The case of Abney v. Fulton County, Ga. (In re Fulton Air Serv., Inc.), 34 B.R.
568 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983), sets forth the rationale for a narrow construction of
§ 365(c). In Fulton, the debtor, Fulton Air Service, and Fulton County entered into a
lease for property located at the Fulton County Airport. See id. at 569. Several years
later the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter I 1 and sought to sell and
assign the lease. See id. at 570. The County objected to the sale and assignment citing a
county ordinance that required approval from the Fulton County Commission for an
assignment of this type of lease. See id. at 571. The County argued that since it did not
consent to the assignment, the lease was nonassignable under applicable law and there-
fore nonassumable and nonassignable under § 365(c)(1). See id.
The court in Fulton disagreed with the County and held that the § 365(c) prohibition
against assumption and assignment should be interpreted narrowly to encompass solely
nondelegable personal service contracts. See id. at 572. The court concluded that a
broad reading of the term "applicable law" in § 365(c)(1) would render the assignment
provision of § 365(0 meaningless. See id. Section 365(0(1) provides that "notwithstand-
ing a provision in... applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assign-
ment of such contract or lease, the trustee may assign such contract or lease under
paragraph (2) of this subsection." Id. at 572 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 365(0(1) (1988)). This
conclusion is premised on the theory that a statute should be read and interpreted in light
of all its provisions so as not to render any one section meaningless or redundant. See id.
In applying a narrow construction to § 365(c), the Fulton court also relied on Con-
gress' goal of allowing financially troubled entities to rehabilitate themselves. The court
noted that often a particular lease is the debtor's primary asset and an integral part of a
reorganization. See id. Accordingly, the court reasoned that prohibiting a debtor from
enjoying the fruits of an assignment would be tantamount to depriving it of a realistic
chance of rehabilitation. See id. Further, the court stated that a broad interpretation of
Section 365 (c)(1) would enable local governments to enact laws that "thwart[ I the legis-
lative purpose of § 365 altogether." Id.
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to section 365(c). These cases construe the term "applicable law"
broadly and literally to encompass both contracts involving nondelegable
personal duties and contracts in which assignment is prohibited by stat-
ute or common law.37
Extending this broad interpretation even further, some courts hold
that section 365(c)(1) precludes assumption when the entity seeking to
assume the contract is a post-petition debtor in possession. These courts
reason that section 365(c)(1) creates a hypothetical test-if applicable
law excuses the nondebtor from accepting performance from someone
other than the debtor or the debtor in possession, then even the debtor in
possession may not assume the contract without the nondebtor's con-
sent.3 ' This interpretation of subsection (c)(1) is quite literal and treats
the debtor in possession as a separate and distinct entity from a pre-peti-
tion party to a contract.39 Courts adopting this reasoning rely on the
amendments to section 365(c)(1)(A) to support their position.'
37. See, e.g., In re West Electronics Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988) (since con-
tract was nonassignable under applicable federal law, § 365(c)(1) precluded debtor in
possession from assuming it); In re Pioneer Ford Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 27, 28-29 (Ist Cir.
1984) (where state statute allows a manufacturer to veto an assignment, § 365(c) pre-
cludes assignment without manufacturer's consent); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v.
Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 943 (5th Cir. 1983)
("[I]f Congress had intended to limit § 365(c) specifically to personal service contracts, its
members could have conceived of a more precise term than 'applicable law' to convey
that meaning."); United States Dep't of Air Force v. Carolina Parachute Corp. (In re
Carolina Parachute Corp.), 108 B.R. 100, 102-03 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (section 365(c) pre-
cludes assumption of contract by debtor in possession where federal statute prohibits
assignment of contract without consent of government), rev'd on other grounds, 907 F.2d
1469 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Lile, 103 B.R. 830, 839 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989) (state statute
prohibiting assignment of leasehold rendered executory lease nonassignable under
§ 365(c)); In re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 71 B.R1 686, 689 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987) (patent
rights, nonassignable under federal law, are nonassignable under § 365(c)); Pennsylvania
Peer Review Org., Inc. v. United States (In re Pennsylvania Peer Review Org., Inc.), 50
B.R. 640, 645 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1985) (federal statute that prohibited transfer of govern-
ment contract rendered executory contract nonassumable pursuant to § 365(c)); In re
Nitec Paper Corp., 43 B.R 492, 497-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (federal statute creating nondel-
egable duties and rights with respect to contracts for "replacement power" rendered con-
tract nonassignable under § 365(c)(1)).
38. See West, 852 F.2d at 83; Carolina Parachute, 108 B.R. at 102; Pennsylvania Peer
Review, 50 B.R. at 645-46; Government Nat'l Mortgage Corp. v. Adana Mortgage Bank-
ers, Inc. (In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc., 12 B.R. 977, 983-85 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1980).
39. See cases cited supra note 38.
40. Section 365(c)(1)(A) has been amended twice since its enactment. In 1984 Con-
gress substituted in (1)(A):
"[A]pplicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or
lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity
other than the debtor or the debtor in possession or an assignee of such contract
or lease, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment
of rights or delegation of duties" for "applicable law excuses a party, other than
the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance from or ren-
dering performance to the trustee or an assignee of such contract or lease,
whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights
or delegation of duties."
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Although this interpretation is facially reasonable, it is not without its
critics." Interestingly, courts that criticize the "separate entity" theory
also point to the congressional amendments to section 365(c)(1)(A) for
support.42
In addition to section 365(c)(1), section 365(c)(2) provides further pro-
tection for the nondebtor by restricting the debtor's ability to assume
certain credit contracts. 43 These include contracts to provide loans, debt
financing, or other "financial accommodations" for the benefit of the
debtor.4" Although the Code does not define "financial accommoda-
tion," it has generally been described as an executory contract that pro-
vides financial support, other than an ordinary loan, on behalf of the
debtor.
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 362(a), 98 Stat. 333, 361.
In 1986, § 365(c)(1)(A) was amended again in order to strike the words "or an assignee
of such contract or lease" after the phrase "debtor in possession." Bankruptcy Judges,
United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554,
§ 283(e)(1), 100 Stat. 3088, 3117. The court in West, for example, argues that this second
amendment "clarified Congress' original intent" and removed any doubt that the literal
interpretation was correct. See West, 852 F.2d at 83 n.2. Significantly, the West court
held that "in the context of assumption and assignment of executory contracts, a solvent
contractor and an insolvent debtor in possession going through bankruptcy are materially
distinct entities." Id. at 83.
41. See, e.g., West, 852 F.2d at 84 (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) ("I do not believe that when it enacted Section 15 of Title 41, Congress
considered the issue of whether a debtor in possession should be viewed as a party differ-
ent than the debtor."); In re Ontario Locomotive & Indus. Ry. Supplies (U.S.) Inc., 126
B.R. 146, 148 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Congress did not intend to bar assumption of
any contract as long as it will be performed by the debtor or debtor in possession.").
42. See, e.g., In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 979 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990)
This amendment makes it clear that the prohibition against a trustee's power to
assume an executory contract does not apply where it is the debtor that is in
possession and the performance to be ... received under a personal service
contract will be the same as if no petition had been filed.
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 27(b) (1980)).
43. See supra note 7.
44. Paragraph (2) is limited in scope, however, and does not apply to all contracts to
extend credit. See Collier 15th ed., supra note 2, 365.05[1], at 365-45.
45. See, e.g., Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Sun Run-
ner Marine, Inc.), 945 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1991) (agreement to provide financing
for boats sold by debtor constituted a "financial accommodation" contract for the benefit
of the debtor); Gill v. Easebe Enters. (In re Easebe Enters.), 900 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir.
1990) (option to purchase real property over a five year period constituted a nonassum-
able "financial accommodation"); Watts v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Co. (In re Watts),
876 F.2d 1090, 1095 (3d Cir. 1989) (commitment to provide mortgage assistance pursu-
ant to state program constituted a nonassumable "financial accommodation" under
§ 365(c)(2) and (e)(2)(B)); Edwards Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co.
(In re Edwards Mobile Home Sales, Inc.), 119 B.R. 857, 859 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)
(surety bond issued on behalf of debtor was held to be a "financial accommodation");
Wegner Farms Co. v. Merchants Bonding Co. (In re Wegner Farms Co.), 49 B.R. 440,
444 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985) (same); Government Nat'l Mortgage Corp. v. Adana Mort-
gage Bankers, Inc. (In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc.), 12 B.R. 977, 986 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1980) (guaranty agreements that enabled debtor to sell securities in the secondary
market were "financial accommodations" under § 365(c)(2)).
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The primary purpose of paragraph (2) is to prevent a nondebtor from
being compelled to finance the reorganization of the bankrupt entity.'
Congress, however, mandated a strict construction of this paragraph that
did not extend to "incidental financial accommodations" accompanying
ordinary contracts to provide goods or services. 7 Courts have generally
adhered to this approach as a way of promoting a debtor's rehabilita-
tion.48 Additionally, section 365(c)(2) makes no mention of a consent
46. The House Report provides as follows:
The purpose of this subsection, at least in part, is to prevent the trustee from
requiring new advances of money or other property. The section permits the
trustee to continue to use and pay for property already advanced, but is not
designed to permit the trusee [sic] to demand new loans or additional transfers
of property under lease commitments.
H.R. Rep. No. 595, supra note 3, at 348, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6304. The
Senate Report uses similar language:
The purpose of this subsection is to make it clear that a party to a transaction
which is based upon the financial strength of a debtor should not be required to
extend new credit to the debtor in the form of loans, lease financing, or the
purchase or discount of notes.
S. Rep. No. 989, supra note 16, at 58-59, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5844-45.
Section 365(c)(2) is an effort by Congress to protect creditors from being forced to
provide "financial accommodations" to a bankrupt entity based on a pre-bankruptcy con-
tract. See Lasebe, 900 F.2d at 1419; In re TS Indus., 117 B.R. 682, 686 (Bankr. D. Utah
1990); Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Charrington Worldwide Enter. (In re Charrington
Worldwide Enter.), 110 B.R. 973, 975 (M.D. Fla. 1990); Whinnery v. Bank of Onalaska
(In re Taggatz), 106 B.R. 983, 990-91 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1989); In re The Travel Shoppe,
Inc., 88 B.R. 466, 470 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988); In re Farrell, 79 B.R. 300, 304 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1987); In re Placid Oil Co., 72 B.R. 135, 139 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987); see also
Louis W. Levit, Use and Disposition of Property Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code Some Practical Concerns, 53 Am. Bankr. L.J. 275, 276 (1979) ("The Code provides
explicitly that there is no way that a debtor can assume [a financing agreement] and thus
compel its lender to continue to advance funds during reorganization.").
In addition to protecting nondebtors, this provision also assists companies that are on
the brink of bankruptcy. Financially impaired companies may be able to obtain quite
reasonable rates from financial institutions given the fact that the contract will be both
unassumable and terminable after the commencement of a bankruptcy case. See Nim-
mer, supra note 3, at 536 (without the protection provided by § 365(c)(2) a party ap-
proaching bankruptcy would have a very difficult time obtaining credit).
47. See 2 Collier 15th ed., supra note 2, 365.05[1], at 365-45 to 365-46 (citing 124
Cong. Rec. Hl1,093 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards)).
48. See Easebe, 900 F.2d at 1419; In re Skylark Travel, Inc., 120 B.R. 352, 354-55
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); Braniff, Inc. v. GPA Group PLC (In re Branifi, Inc.), 118 B.R.
819, 845 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Thomas B. Hamilton Co.
(In re Thomas B. Hamilton Co.), 115 B.R. 384, 386 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990), aff'd, 969
F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1992); Taggatz, 106 B.R. at 992 n. 11; In re Charrington Worldwide
Enter., 98 B.R. 65, 68 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989), aff'd, 110 B.R. 973 (M.D. Fla. 1990);
Travel Shoppe, 88 B.R. at 470; Karsh Travel, Inc. v. Airlines Reporting Corp. (In re
Karsh Travel, Inc.), 87 B.R 110, 111 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd, 102 B.R. 778 (N.D.
Cal. 1989), appeal dismissed and vacated in part, 942 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1991); see also TS
Industries, 117 B.R. at 687 (section 365(c)(2) does not bar a debtor from assuming an
executory contract to provide "financial accommodations" which was part of a pre-peti-
tion workout and entered into in anticipation of a bankruptcy filing). But see In re Lock-
spur, Inc., 82 B.R. 37, 39 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1987) (agreement between debtor and Airline
Reporting Corporation that authorized debtor to issue blank airline tickets constituted a
"financial accommodation").
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requirement, and a literal reading of this section would prohibit the
debtor from assuming an executory contract with or without the
nondebtor's consent.49 This literal interpretation, however, has not been
widely accepted. Pointing to the Code's objective of providing debtors
with an opportunity to rehabilitate, several courts have declined to read
section 365(c)(2) so formally. Rather, they have allowed the debtor in
possession to assume an otherwise nonassumable contract provided the
creditor has consented.50
3. Section 365(e): Prohibition of ipsofacto Clauses
The provisions of section 365(e) also balance a nondebtor's right to
receive the benefits of the original contractual bargain with a debtor's
ability to attempt a successful reorganization. Section 365(e)(1), for ex-
ample, renders unenforceable ipso facto or bankruptcy termination
clauses. 5' In this regard, the Code seeks to promote a debtor's
49. See Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Sun Runner
Marine, Inc.), 945 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1991). In Sun Runner, the Ninth Circuit ex-
pounded several arguments for holding that subsection 365(c)(2) prohibited assumption
of a financing agreement by the debtor even if the creditor consented to such assumption.
First, the court pointed out that while 1 (2) makes no mention of a consent requirement,
$ (1) explicitly permits assumption if the nondebtor consents. See id. at 1092. Thus, it
was not likely to be a mere oversight on the part of the drafters. See id. Second, the
court stated that permitting Sun Runner to assume the contract would enable Transamer-
ica to receive full payment at the expense of other creditors. See id. at 1093. The court
noted that § 364 governs post-petition financing by allowing a debtor to offer specific
incentives to potential creditors. These incentives include allowing a creditor to receive
an administrative expense priority claim under § 364(b), a "super-priority" claim pursu-
ant to § 364(c)(1), or a lien on unencumbered assets under § 364(c)(2) or (3). See id. at
1092-93. In sum, the court stated the following: "[T]he section 365(c)(2) prohibition
against the assumption of financial accommodation contracts protects all unsecured cred-
itors, not just the lender, and the lender's consent alone is not sufficient to abrogate it."
Id. at 1093; see also In re Placid Oil Co., 72 B.R. 135, 139 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (court
prohibited debtor in possession from assuming financial accommodation despite credi-
tor's consent); 1 Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice, supra note 31, § 23.08.60, at 17
(termination of a credit contract upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition protects third
party creditors who will be potential claimants against the estate).
50. See In re Easebe Enters., 900 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir. 1990); In re TS Indus.,
Inc., 117 B.R. 682, 687 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990); In re Charrington Worldwide Enter., 98
B.R. 65, 68 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989), aff'd, 110 B.R. 973 (M.D. Fla. 1990); Government
Nat'l Mortgage Corp. v. Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (In re Adana Mortgage Bankers,
Inc.), 12 B.R. 977, 984 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); see also In re Prime, Inc., 15 B.R. 216,
219 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) ("The statutory pattern permits the inference in the lan-
guage of § 365(c)(2) that the trustee may assume a contract for debt financing if the
creditor consents.").
51. See DiCello v. United States (In re Ry. Reorganization Estate, Inc.), 133 B.R.
578, 582 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991); Oklahoma Plaza Investors, Ltd. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.(In re Oklahoma Plaza Investors, Ltd.), 124 B.R. 108, 113 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991); In
re Monica Scott, Inc., 123 B.R. 990, 992 n.6 (Bankr. D. Minn 1991); In re Hunter, 121
B.R. 609, 613 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1990); see also In re TS Indus. Inc., 117 B.R. 682, 685(Bankr. D. Utah 1990) (section 365(e)(1) nullifies nondebtor's contractual efforts to avoid
doing business with a debtor in possession after the commencement of the case); In re
Texaco, Inc., 73 B.R. 960, 965 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (indenture provision providing for
acceleration of principal and interest payments upon debtor's default is unenforceable
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rehabilitation.52
Section 365(e)(2), however, provides some protection for creditors and
other nondebtors by excepting certain executory contracts from the pur-
view of section 365(e)(1). For instance, employing language closely par-
allel to section 365(c)(1), section 365(e)(2)(A) provides that the
prohibition against ipso facto clauses does not apply to contracts where
"applicable law" excuses the nondebtor from accepting performance
from a third party.5 3 Once again, arriving at a precise meaning of "appli-
cable law" becomes a central issue.54 That is, if one interprets the lan-
guage in section 365(c)(1) liberally, to encompass more than
nondelegable personal service contracts, then ipso facto clauses pursuant
to section 365(e)(2)(A) will be frequently enforced." If, however, one
construes the exception in section 365(c)(1) narrowly to include only
nondelegable personal service contracts, then ipsofacto clauses will have
considerably less impact.16 Keeping with the spirit of this latter view,
some courts have held that assumption by a debtor in possession does not
constitute a prohibited assignment within the meaning of section
365(e)(2)(A). 57
Paragraph (B) of section 365(e)(2) provides additional protection for
when such default is triggered by a bankruptcy filing); In re Rittenhouse Carpet, Inc., 56
B.R. 131, 131-32 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (section 365(e) prohibits the removal of a
debtor-partner solely on account of a bankruptcy filing notwithstanding state law to the
contrary).
52. The legislative history states in pertinent part as follows:
Subsection (e) invalidates ipso facto or bankruptcy clauses. These clauses, pro-
tected under present law, automatically terminate the contract or lease, or per-
mit the other contracting party to terminate the contract or lease, in the event
of bankruptcy. This frequently hampers rehabilitation efforts. If the trustee
may assume or assign the contract under the limitations imposed by the remain-
der of the section, then the contract or lease may be utilized to assist in the
debtor's rehabilitation or liquidation.
The unenforceability of ipso facto or bankruptcy clauses proposed under this
section will require the courts to be sensitive to the rights of the nondebtor
party to executory contracts and unexpired leases. If the trustee is to assume a
contract or lease, the court will have to insure that the trustees performance
under the contract or lease gives the other contracting party the full benefit of
his bargain.
H.R. Rep. No. 595, supra note 3, at 348-49, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6304-05;
S. Rep. No. 989, supra note 16, at 59, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5845; see also Nim-
mer, supra note 3, at 540-41 (discussing impetus behind § 365(e)(1)). Professor Nimmer
also points out that although this provision is intended to help a post-bankrupt entity
rehabilitate, it may make some nondebtors quite hesitant to deal with a financially dis-
tressed entity. Thus, this provision may ironically result in more bankruptcy filings. See
iad at 543-44.
53. See supra note 12.
54. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
55. See cases cited supra note 37.
56. See cases cited supra note 35; see also 2 Collier 15th ed., supra note 2, f 365.06[l],
at 365-50 (expressing the view that § 365(e)(2) exception to the prohibition against ipso
facto clauses is limited to nondelegable personal service contracts).
57. See, e-g., In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 981 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990)
("[A]ssumption of the contracts by the Trustee on behalf of the estate with performance
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nondebtors5 8 In the same language used in section 365(c)(2),19 this par-
agraph exempts credit contracts from the prohibition on ipso facto
clauses provided for in section 365(e)(1). ° Again, this provision is
designed to guard against the possibility of a nondebtor being forced to
finance a debtor's rehabilitation effort.6 ' Given the paramount impor-
tance of achieving a successful reorganization, however, courts have con-
strued this provision narrowly.62
Assuming that section 365(c) or (e)(2) applies to an executory con-
tract, the question remains whether the nondebtor must seek relief from
the automatic stay of section 362 before terminating the contract. Sec-
tions 365(c) and (e)(2) do not address this question, and currently no
consensus has been reached among the bankruptcy courts. Before ana-
lyzing the arguments presented by the various sides and offering a solu-
tion, however, it is important to become familiar with the automatic stay
provision of section 362. This, in turn, requires an understanding of the
definition of property of the estate as defined by section 541 of the Code.
B. Sections 362 and 541: The Automatic Stay of Actions Against
Property of the Estate
1. General Language of Sections 362(a) and 541(a)
Section 362-the automatic stay provision-is a very significant part
of the Bankruptcy Code. Once triggered, the stay stops all collection
efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions against the debtor. 63
By delaying these acts and proceedings, the stay gives the debtor a
by the Debtor would not constitute an assignment within the meaning intended by
§ 365(c)(1)(A) or § 365(e)(2)(A).").
58. See supra note 12.
59. See supra note 7.
60. See, e.g., Watts v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Co. (In re Watts), 876 F.2d 1090, 1095
(3d Cir. 1989) (commitment by government agency to make mortgage payments on be-
half of eligible homeowners was an executory contract falling within the scope of
§ 365(c)(2) and (e)(2)(B) and thus could be suspended during a bankruptcy proceeding);
Wegner Farms Co. v. Merchants Bonding Co. (In re Wegner Farms Co.), 49 B.R. 440,
444 (N.D. Iowa 1985) (surety bond issued on behalf of debtor constituted a "financial
accommodation" within the meaning of § 365(c) and (e)(2) and could be terminated upon
the debtor's bankruptcy filing); Dean v. Postle Enters., Inc. (In re Postle Enters., Inc.), 48
B.R. 721, 725 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985) (funding agreement which permitted debtor to
demand $150,000 cash transfer constituted a "financial accommodation" which could be
terminated upon commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding pursuant to § 365(e)(2)(B));
In re New Town Mall, 17 B.R. 326, 327 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1982) (contract to provide
financing is exempt from the prohibition barring "ipso facto" clauses in § 365(e)(1)).
61. See supra note 46.
62. See Edwards Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. (In re Edwards
Mobile Home Sales, Inc.), 119 B.R. 857, 860 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); Citizens & S. Nat'l
Bank v. Thomas B. Hamilton Co. (In re Thomas B. Hamilton Co.), 115 B.R. 384, 386
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990), aff'd, 969 F.2d 1013 (11 th Cir. 1992); In re Charrington World-
wide Enter., 98 B.R. 65, 68 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989), aff'd, 110 B.R. 973 (M.D. Fla.
1990).
63. See H.R. Rep No. 595, supra note 3, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6297; S. Rep. No. 989, supra note 16, at 54, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5840.
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"breathing spell" from his creditors." It provides the debtor with an
opportunity to assess his situation and develop a reorganization or repay-
ment plan.65 In addition, the stay provides protection for creditors by
preventing some creditors from obtaining more than their fair share of
the estate by unilaterally seeking a remedy.
66
Section 362(a) sets out the scope of the stay by listing the various acts
that are halted by the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding. Spe-
cifically, section 362(a)(3) provides that the filing of a bankruptcy peti-
tion operates as a stay of "any act to obtain possession of property of the
estate.",67 Section 541(a), the section that defines property of the estate,
does not explicitly mention contract rights but does state that the term
includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of
the commencement of the case."' 68 The legislative history indicates that
Congress intended the scope of this provision to be "broad"-encom-
passing, among other things, "tangible or intangible property.1 69
2. Executory Contracts as Property of the Estate:
Historical Background
Historically, executory contracts were not included as part of the
property of the estate until assumed by the debtor or trustee.70 The hold-
ing in Cheadle v. Appleatchee Riders Ass'n (In re Lovitt),7' a Ninth Cir-
64. See University Medical Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re University Medical Ctr.), 973 F.2d
1065, 1074 (3d Cir. 1992); B.F. Goodrich Employees Federal Credit Union v. Patterson
(In re Patterson), 967 F.2d 505, 512 n.9 (11th Cir. 1992); Independent Union of Flight
Attendants v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 966 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1992); Borman
v. Raymark Indus., 946 F.2d 1031, 1033 (3d Cir. 1991); Shugrue v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n,
Int'l (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 922 F.2d 984, 989 (2d Cir. 1990), cerL denied, 112
S.Ct. 50 (1991); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1988); H.R.
Rep No. 595, supra note 3, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6296-97; S. Rep.
No. 989, supra note 16, at 54-55, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5840-41.
65. See H.R. Rep No. 595, supra note 3, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6297; S. Rep. No. 989, supra note 16, at 54-55, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5840-
41.
66. See H.R. Rep No. 595, supra note 3, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6297; S. Rep. No. 989, supra note 16, at 49, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5835
("Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to the
detriment of other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly liquidation
procedure under which all creditors are treated equally. A race of diligence by creditors
for the debtor's assets prevents that.").
67. See supra note 14.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
69. See U.S. v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-05 (1983); In re Yonikus, 974
F.2d 901, 904-05 (7th Cir. 1992); Barowsky v. Serelson (In re Barowsky), 946 F.2d 1516,
1518-19 (10th Cir. 1991); Wissman v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 942 F.2d 867, 869-70 (4th
Cir. 1991); In re Nejberger, 934 F.2d 1300, 1301-02 (3d Cir. 1991); H.IL Rep. No. 595,
supra note 3, at 367-68, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6323; S. Rep. No. 989, supra
note 16, at 82, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5868.
70. See Chandler Act of July 22, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, ch. 575, § 70b, 52 Stat.
840, 880-81 (amending Bankruptcy Act of 1898) (repealed 1978).
71. 757 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 849 (1985).
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cuit case decided under the Bankruptcy Act, 72 is representative of this
"exclusionary view":
Because executory contracts and leases involve future liabilities as well
as rights, ... an affirmative act of assumption by the trustee is required
to bring the property into the estate in order to ensure that the estate is
not charged with the liabilities except upon due deliberation. Thus,
executory contracts and leases-unlike all other assets-do not vest in
the trustee as of the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. They, • 73
vest only upon the trustee's timely and affirmative act of assumption.
Supporters of this view argue that the exclusionary theory was codified in
the Bankruptcy Act by virtue of the 1938 Chandler Act amendments. 74
Further, they claim that when the Code was enacted in 1978, it adopted
the basic language of the Act in this area, and there is no indication in
the legislative history that Congress intended to alter the underlying ex-
clusionary doctrine.75
Detractors of the exclusionary theory counter that it has no founda-
tion in the Code and that it actually circumvents the entire purpose of
section 541(a).7 ' They argue that Congress espoused a "broad" reading
of section 541(a) that consisted of" 'all kinds of property, including tan-
gible or intangible property.' ,77 Further, section 541 contains no provi-
sion for adding to the property of the estate those contracts assumed
under section 365.78 Critics have also observed that the "[exclusionary
theory] forces us to evade and distort the whole structure of section 541,
creating manifold possibilities for confusion and error."7 9
Various circuit court opinions also reflect this divergence of views
among legal scholars. Courts that adhere to an exclusionary theory hold
that a debtor's interest in a contract governed by section 365(c) or (e)(2)
is not property of the estate since the contract is nonassumable and non-
assignable. As such, a nondebtor need not seek relief from the automatic
stay before terminating the contract. ° Other courts counter that a
72. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
73. Lovitt, 757 F.2d at 1041 (citations omitted).
74. See Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited: A Reply to Professor
Westbrook, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 19-21 (1991).
75. See id. at 20; Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Under-
standing "Rejection," 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 845, 862 n.77 (1988).
76. See Jay L. Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 Minn. L.
Rev. 227, 325 (1989) (exclusionary theory results in extensive possibilities for confusion
and error).
77. Computer Communications, Inc. v. Codex Corp. (In re Computer Communica-
tions, Inc.), 824 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 595, supra note 3,
at 367, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6323).
78. See Westbrook, supra note 76, at 325; see also Douglas W. Bordewieck, The
Postpetition, Pre-Rejection, Pre-Assumption Status of an Executory Contract, 59 Am.
Bankr. L.J. 197, 200 n.18 (1985) ("Surely the debtor's interest in an executory contract is
property of the estate.").
79. Westbrook, supra note 76, at 325.
80. See, e.g., Watts v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Co. (In re Watts), 876 F.2d 1090,
1095-96 (3d Cir. 1989) (to hold the stay applicable to § 365(e)(2)(B) contracts would
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debtor's interest in a contract becomes property of the estate immediately
upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Consequently, a nondebtor
must seek relief from the stay before terminating a contract that it be-
lieves is nonassumable and nonassignable under section 365(c) or
(e)(2).81
If the automatic stay is imposed, or if a nondebtor simply seeks relief
from the stay as a precautionary measure,82 courts generally hold that
establishing the applicability of section 365(c) or (e)(2) is sufficient to
establish "cause" 3 for relief from the stay.8 4 Thus, the various interpre-
tations accorded to section 365(c) 5 and, by analogy, to section
365(e)(2),16 will directly impact a nondebtor's ability to obtain relief from
the stay.8 7
force the nondebtor to ask for something that the Bankruptcy Code already gives him);
Tonry v. Hebert (In re Tonry), 724 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1984) (debtor's interest in an
executory contract does not become property of the estate until it is assumed); In re New
Town Mall, 17 B.R 326, 329 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1982) (automatic stay does not toll expira-
tion of a loan commitment contract).
81. See, ag., Computer Communications, Inc. v. Codex Corp. (In re Computer Com-
munications, Inc.), 824 F.2d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Even if [the nondebtor] had a
valid reason for terminating the Agreement, it still was required to petition the court for
relief from the automatic stay under section 362(d)."); Wegner Farms Co. v. Merchants
Bonding Co. (In re Wegner Farms Co.), 49 B.R. 440, 445 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985)
(applying the automatic stay to § 365(c) and (e) contracts is wholly consistent with the
purposes and policies of the Bankruptcy Code); Government Nat'l Mortgage Corp. v.
Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc.), 12 B.RL 977, 983
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (automatic stay requires that nondebtor prove "applicability of
[s]ection 365(e)(2) to the [c]ourt before taking action to terminate the contract").
82. See infra note 101.
83. Section 362(d) states in relevant part as follows:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall
grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as
by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay-
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in prop-
erty of such party in interest; ....
11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988).
84. See In re Priestley, 93 B.R. 253, 261-62 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1988); Dean v. Postle
Enters., Inc. (In re Postle Enters., Inc.), 48 B.1L 721, 725 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985); Gov-
ernment Nat'l Mortgage Corp. v. Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (In re Adana Mortgage
Bankers, Inc.), 12 B.R. 977, 987-88 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); see also In re Cardinal
Indus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 971 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) ("If the movants are successful
in establishing the continued enforceability of the ipsofacto clauses, relief from the auto-
matic stay will be granted as a matter of course.").
85. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
87. If relief from the stay is not a prerequisite for termination but a nondebtor errone-
ously terminates the contract thinking it falls within the purview of section 365(c) or
(e)(2), then it may be liable for contempt damages. See cases cited infra note 142.
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II. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN SECTIONS 362 AND 365
A. Automatic Stay Not Applicable to Nonassumable or Nonassignable
Contracts under Section 365(c) or (e)(2)
In holding that the automatic stay is not applicable to contracts falling
within the purview of section 365(c) or (e)(2), courts have relied primar-
ily on a theory of statutory interpretation and legislative intent. The
Third Circuit's holding in Watts v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Co. (In
re Watts),8 is a leading example of this line of reasoning. In Watts,
Pennsylvania's Homeowner's Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program
("HEMAP") authorized the Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency
("PHFA") to pay monthly mortgage payments directly to mortgagees on
behalf of needy homeowners.8 9 The program was a governmental effort
designed to reduce the growing number of mortgage foreclosures. 9 Be-
cause HEMAP operated with limited funds, however, the program called
for the suspension of all payments during a bankruptcy proceeding, since
the automatic stay prohibited foreclosure during this period.9 The
debtor-homeowner plaintiffs in Watts brought the action after receiving
notice that their assistance under HEMAP was being terminated. They
claimed that PHFA's suspension of monthly assistance following the fil-
ing of their bankruptcy petitions violated the automatic stay provision of
section 362.92
The Third Circuit found that PHFA's commitments to the plaintiffs
were executory contracts to "make a loan or extend other debt financ-
ing" under section 365(c)(2) and thus were terminable under section
365(e)(2)(B). 93 More importantly, the court held that the automatic stay
provision did not prohibit the unilateral termination of such contracts. 94
The court reasoned that since the Code explicitly permits the post-filing
termination of executory contracts to make loans, staying such termina-
tion under section 362 "would be at worst anomalous, and at best an
imposition of a pro forma requirement that the creditor must ask for
what the Code plainly grants him."95 The court concluded that because
Congress explicitly prohibited assumption or assignment of contracts
falling within the scope of section 365(c) or (e)(2), section 362 should not
be interpreted to give the debtor a benefit to which it was not entitled.96
88. 876 F.2d 1090 (3d Cir. 1989).
89. See id. at 1091.
90. See id.
91. The program allowed the debtor to reapply for the assistance after the court lifted
the stay or upon termination of bankruptcy proceedings making foreclosure imminent.
See id.
92. See id. at 1092.
93. See id. at 1095-96.
94. See id. at 1096.
95. Id.; see also Buschman, supra note 19, at 348-49 (termination of nonassumable
executory contracts not barred by automatic stay).
96. See Watts v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Co. (In re Watts), 876 F.2d 1090, 1096 (3d
Cir. 1989).
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More specifically, the court stated that "the intention of Congress in en-
acting section 362(a)(3) cannot be considered in isolation without regard
for the rest of the Bankruptcy Code."'9 7
The Watts court recognized contrary authority arguing for the appli-
cation of the automatic stay in these instances. 9 Nevertheless, the Third
Circuit stated that in the bankruptcy setting, as in other legal settings, a
"post-hoc challenge suffices to protect relevant interests." 99 In particu-
lar, the court analogized a nondebtor's unilateral termination to that of a
party's refusal to perform a contractual obligation in a nonbankruptcy
setting believing that the other party has breached."o The court stated,
"While a declaratory judgment would no doubt be comforting, if one
party's breach justifies the second's nonperformance, the second may
take a chance and not perform when it perceives the first breached."' °'
Other courts, while not directly addressing the issue of the automatic
stay, explicitly adhere to the exclusionary theory."0 2 These courts hold
that a debtor's interest in an executory contract does not automatically
vest in the bankruptcy estate at the time of filing the petition. 0 3 They
97. Id. at 1095; see also In re New Town Mall, 17 B.R. 326, 329 (Bankr. D. S.D.
1982) ("[W]here one section of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly governs an issue, another
section should not be interpreted to cause an irreconcilable conflict.") (citing Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1961)).
98. See Watts, 876 F.2d at 1096.
99. Id (footnote omitted).
100. See id at 1096 n.11.
101. Id Although the court in Watts was comfortable with "a post-hoc challenge" to
a nondebtor's unilateral termination, it noted that a nondebtor may want to seek relief
from the stay in a close case in order to avoid liability for ex parte action that is later
found to be unlawful. See id
Moreover, the fact that the state designed the program to assist needy families may
have influenced the holding in Watts. The court noted, "We would be extremely reluc-
tant to bar the [government agency] in the future from taking steps required by Penn-
sylvania law and authorized by the Bankruptcy Code to protect the HEMAP fund." Id.
at 1095 n.8. Additionally, the court pointed out that holding the stay inapplicable under
the facts of this case would not undermine its underlying policy of providing the debtor
with a "breathing spell." Id at 1096. Thus, the holding in Watts may be limited to its
particular facts and circumstances.
The holding in In re New Town Mall, 17 B.Rt 326 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1982), a case cited
by Watts, may also be limited to its facts. In this case, the unsecured creditors committee
joined the debtor in possession in arguing that the automatic stay tolled the expiration of
a loan commitment issued to the debtor by an insurance company. See id. at 326-27.
After concluding that the loan commitment was terminable under § 365(e)(2)(B) and not
assumable or assignable under § 365(e)(2), the court held that the automatic stay should
not be construed to toll the expiration of the commitment. See id. at 327-29. Signifi-
cantly, the court concluded that since "tolling" did not require any affirmative steps on
the part of the nondebtor, it was not an "act" encompassed by § 362. See id. at 328-29.
Thus, potentially, this court may hold that unilateral termination of the contract-argua-
bly an "act" under § 362-is precluded by the automatic stay.
102. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
103. See Tonry v. Hebert (In re Tonry), 724 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1984); Ford,
Bacon & Davis, Inc. v. Holahan, 311 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
913 (1963); In re Carrere, 64 B.Rt 156, 158 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986); In re Bofill, 25 B.RL
550, 552 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Noonan, 17 B.R. 793, 797-98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1982).
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require a trustee to assume the contract in order for a debtor's interest in
it to become property of the estate."° Because the trustee cannot assume
contracts governed by section 365(c) or (e)(2), a debtor's interest in these
contracts cannot become part of the estate.105 Thus, since section
362(a)(3) stays only those actions to obtain property of the estate, pre-
sumably this approach would not require the nondebtor to seek relief
from the automatic stay in this situation. 6
This exclusionary approach as well as the plain meaning/legislative
intent reasoning espoused in Watts have met with considerable criticism.
The jurisprudence in this area is shifting toward a broader interpretation
of sections 541 and 362-one that implicitly holds that contractual rights
vest in the property of the estate immediately upon the filing of a peti-
tion. Moreover, this line of reasoning also relies on legislative intent and
the precise language of the pertinent sections of the Code for support.
B. Automatic Stay Applicable to Contracts Governed by Sections
365(c) and (e)(2)
In contrast to Watts and the other cases discussed above, another line
of reasoning holds that a nondebtor must seek relief from the automatic
stay before unilaterally terminating an executory contract with a
debtor. 107 The Ninth Circuit case Computer Communications, Inc. v. Co-
dex Corp. (In re Computer Communications, Inc.),10 is a leading exam-
ple of this treatment of the interaction between sections 362 and 365.109
Computer Communications involved a communication equipment manu-
facturer, Codex, that entered into an agreement to purchase equipment
and computer software from Computer Communications, Inc. (CCI).
CCI subsequently filed a bankruptcy petition, and Codex terminated the
agreement pursuant to a bankruptcy termination provision or ipso facto
clause.°10 CCI then brought suit claiming that Codex's unilateral termi-
nation violated the automatic stay."' Codex countered by claiming that
the termination clause was enforceable under section 365(e)(2) and, as a
104. See cases cited supra note 103.
105. See id.
106. See La Sala, supra note 6, at 635-36 n.90.
107. See Computer Communications, Inc. v. Codex Corp. (In re Computer Communi-
cations, Inc.), 824 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 1987); Edwards Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v.
Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. (In re Edwards Mobile Home Sales, Inc.), 119 B.R. 857, 859-60(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); Wegner Farms Co. v. Merchants Bonding Co. (In re Wegner
Farms Co.), 49 B.R. 440, 445 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985); Government Nat'l Mortgage
Corp. v. Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc.), 12 B.R.
977, 983 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
108. 824 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1987).
109. Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit seemed to disavow its earlier position in Cheadle
v. Appleatchee Riders Ass'n (In re Lovitt), 757 F.2d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 849 (1985), wherein it expressly advocated the preclusion-from-the-estate
concept.
110. See Computer Communications, 824 F.2d at 726-27.
111. See id.
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result, the automatic stay did not preclude unilateral termination. 12
The Ninth Circuit agreed with CCI, holding that even if the contract
was terminable under section 365(e)(2), section 362 automatically stayed
termination." 3 As support for this approach, the court cited legislative
intent as well as the overall statutory scheme and purpose of the Bank-
ruptcy Code." 4 The court began by stating that Congress imposed the
automatic stay to give the debtor a "breathing spell" from creditors so it
could begin a successful reorganization. 115 The court added that the
scope of the stay is broad: "All proceedings are stayed, including arbitra-
tion, license revocation, administrative, and judicial proceedings. Pro-
ceeding in this sense encompasses civil actions as well, and all
proceedings even if they are not before governmental tribunals.""' 6
Since section 362 stays acts against property of the estate, the Ninth
Circuit then focused on the definition of property as provided in the
Code. The court noted that section 541(a) provides that property of the
estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property
as of the commencement of the case.""' In interpreting this provision,
the court looked to the House Report issued with the Code: "The scope
of this paragraph is broad. It includes all kinds of property, including
tangible or intangible property.""' Moreover, although section 362
.stays immediate acts against property of the estate, the court stated that
it is not designed to permanently deprive a party of its property."19 In-
stead, upon notice and a hearing, a nondebtor may obtain relief from the
stay for "cause."1 0
Notwithstanding the broad scope of sections 362 and 541, defendant
Codex argued that executory contracts do not vest in property of the
112. See id.
113. See id. at 730; see also Edwards Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins.
Co. (In re Edwards Mobile Home Sales, Inc.), 119 B.R. 857, 859-60 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1990) (even though surety bond issued on behalf of debtor was a "financial accommoda-
tion," bonding company was required to seek relief from the automatic stay before termi-
nating the bond); Wegner Farms Co. v. Merchants Bonding Co. (In re Wegner Farms
Co.), 49 B.R. 440, 444 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985) (same).
114. See Computer Communications, 824 F.2d at 729.
115. See id. (citing S. Rep. No. 989, supra note 16, at 54-55, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5840-41).
116. Id. (quoting H.R. No. 595, supra note 3, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6297).
117. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988)).
118. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 595, supra note 3, at 367, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6323); see also Wegner Farms Co. v. Merchants Bonding Co. (In re
Wegner Farms Co.), 49 B.R. 440, 443 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985) (contractual rights con-
stitute intangible property which is included within the definition of property of the es-
tate); Westbrook, supra note 76, at 325 (contract interests, which are often used to secure
financing, certainly fall within this broad definition).
119. See Computer Communications, Inc. v. Codex Corp. (In re Computer Communi-
cations, Inc.), 824 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 1987).
120. See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988)); see also supra note 83 (for terminology
of § 362(d)).
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estate until they are assumed by the trustee. 2' The Ninth Circuit re-
jected this argument, citing the version of section 541(c)(1) in effect at
the time the contract was executed.1 22 At that time, section 541(c)(1)
provided that an interest of the debtor in a contract became property of
the estate despite "any provision" restricting assignability or "condi-
tioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor."123 Cogni-
zant of the expansive scope of section 541 espoused by Congress, the
court interpreted the phrase "any provision" broadly to include any con-
tract provision or any state or other federal law provision restricting as-
signment. 24 Moreover, the court noted that Congress subsequently
broadened the scope of section 541(c)(1) to read "notwithstanding any
provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or applicable nonban-
kruptcy law."12 This amendment further buttressed the court's holding
that a debtor's interest in contract vests upon filing of a bankruptcy peti-
tion, notwithstanding the potential applicability of section 365(c) or
(e)(2).126
In addition to legislative history and the actual language of the Code,
courts requiring nondebtors to seek relief from the stay also premise their
conclusion on the statutory scheme of the Code. This approach reasons
that although Congress expressly exempted certain actions from the au-
tomatic stay, 127 none of the exceptions can be interpreted to embrace
unilateral termination of an executory contract arguably governed by
section 365(c) or (e)(2).' 28  Congress also expressly overrode the provi-
121. See cases cited supra notes 80, 103.
122. See Computer Communications, 824 F.2d at 730.
123. The version of § 541(c)(1) in effect prior to the 1984 amendment stated in perti-
nent part as follows:
[Alan interest of the debtor... becomes property of the estate... notwithstand-
ing any provision-
(A) that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the debtor; or
(B) that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor,
on the commencement of a case under this title, or on the appointment of or the
taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a custodian, and that
effects or gives an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or termination of
the debtor's interest in property.
11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1).
124. See Computer Communications, Inc. v. Codex Corp. (In re Computer Communi-
cations, Inc.), 824 F.2d 725, 730 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Neavear v. Schweiker (In re
Neavear), 674 F.2d 1201, 1205-06 & n.12 (7th Cir. 1982) (entitlement to social security
benefits considered to be property of the estate under § 541(c)(1)(A) even though ex-
pressly "not... transferable or assignable under 42 U.S.C. § 207"); In re Dawson, 13
B.R. 107, 108-09 (M.D. Ala. 1981) (disability benefits that were nonassignable under
state law were held to be property of the estate under § 541(c)).
125. Computer Communications, 824 F.2d at 730 (citing Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-353, § 456(b)(1), 98 Stat. 333, 376).
126. See id.
127. See I1 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1988).
128. See Computer Communications, 824 F.2d at 730; Wegner Farms Co. v.
Merchants Bonding Co. (In re Wegner Farms Co.), 49 B.R. 440, 444 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1985); see also Edwards Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. (In re Ed-
wards Mobile Home Sales, Inc.), 119 B.R. 857, 860 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) ("If Section
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sions of the stay in certain instances,129 but did not do so in section
365(c) or (e)(2).130
Additionally, courts adhering to this expansive reading of sections 362
and 541 point to public policy reasons for support. The court in Com-
puter Communications, for example, summarized the policy underlying
the automatic stay as follows:
Congress designed [the automatic stay] to protect debtors and credi-
tors from piecemeal dismemberment of the debtor's estate. The auto-
matic stay statute itself provides a summary procedure for obtaining
relief from the stay. All parties benefit from the fair and orderly pro-
cess contemplated by the automatic stay and judicial relief procedure.
Judicial toleration of an alternative procedure of self-help and ?post hoc
justification would defeat the purpose of the automatic stay.
Finally, the court in Wegner Farms Co. v. Merchants Bonding Co. (In re
Wegner Farms Co.)' 32 concluded that
bringing these kinds of contracts within the ambit of the automatic
stay ensures that the legal question of whether a particular contract
may be terminated will be decided in the proper forum, after a full
briefing by the parties, rather than by a nondebtor party acting unilat-
erally and perhaps erroneously.133
365(e)(2) was sufficient in itself to allow termination, then effectively it would create an
exception to the automatic stay outside of those already specifically delineated in the
Code."); Government Nat'l Mortgage Corp. v. Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (In re
Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc.), 12 B.R. 977, 989 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (court rejected
argument that a nondebtor could unilaterally terminate contracts governed by sections
365(c) and (e)(2)).
129. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (nullifying the provisions of
the automatic stay and the power of the court to enjoin a creditor from taking possession
of aircraft equipment or vessels unless debtor complies with certain conditions within 60
days after commencement of a case).
130. See Computer Communications, 824 F.2d at 730; Wegner, 49 B.L at 444.
131. Computer Communications, 824 F.2d at 731; see also Edwards Mobile Home
Sales, 119 B.R. at 859 (quoting Computer Communications, 824 F.2d at 731); Adana
Mortgage Bankers, 12 B.R. at 997:
The stay insures that all of the property of the Debtor will be brought into the
custody of the "bankruptcy court by the filing of the petition, and no interfer-
ence with that custody can be countenanced without the court's permission."
Without such a provision the orderly liquidation or rehabilitation of the Debtor
would be impossible.
(footnotes omitted).
132. 49 B.R. 440 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985).
133. Id. at 445. A debtor's chances for a successful reorganization would be severely
impaired by an erroneous termination of a contract that is a valuable asset of the debtor's
estate. See id at 445-46; see also Edwards Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins.
Co. (In re Edwards Mobile Home Sales, Inc.), 119 B.R. 857, 860 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)
(quoting Wegner, 49 B.R. at 445).
If a nondebtor is forced to seek relief from the stay before terminating the contract, the
particular interpretation accorded § 365(c) and (e)(2) will become crucial to its chances
of success. See supra notes 32-37, 53-57 and accompanying text. For example, a
nondebtor would be more likely to obtain relief from the stay under a broad interpreta-
tion of these two exceptions to the general rule permitting assumption than under a nar-
row interpretation.
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III. SOLUTION: THE AUTOMATIC STAY SHOULD PRECLUDE
NONDEBTORS FROM UNILATERALLY TERMINATING NONASSUMABLE
AND NONASSIGNABLE CONTRACTS UNDER SECTION 365(c) OR (e)(2)
While Watts's "isolation" theory and In re Lovitt's "exclusionary the-
ory" may appear convincing at first view, neither comports with the lan-
guage of the Code, nor the legislative intent underlying it. Both theories
disregard the broad language of sections 541 and 362 as well as the policy
reasons underpinning the automatic stay. In contrast, the reasoning in
Computer Communications more correctly interprets the language of sec-
tion 541 as well as the interplay between sections 362 and 365. Conse-
quently, this approach achieves a primary goal of bankruptcy-
rehabilitation of the debtor-in the most efficient manner.
A. The Reasoning of Watts Is Unsound
The Watts opinion does not address the issue of property of the estate
for purposes of the automatic stay because the court concluded that the
"intention of Congress in enacting section 362(a)(3) cannot be considered
in isolation without regard for the rest of the Bankruptcy Code."' 3 4 The
Third Circuit was unwilling to grant protection under section 362
" 'when the [contrary] intent of Congress appears clear at 11 U.S.C.
§ 365.' "135 Basically, the court declined to construe section 362 in a
manner that would conflict with the intent behind sections 365(c) and
(e)(2).
This reasoning is flawed because one could counter that sections 365(c)
and (e)(2) should not be considered in isolation with respect to the auto-
matic stay of section 362. In fact, the argument that Code sections can-
not be viewed in isolation supports the application of the automatic stay
to contracts that may or may not be assumable or assignable. For exam-
ple, although Congress explicitly exempted specific actions from the stay
and expressly overrode the stay in other instances, contracts governed by
section 365(c) or (e)(2) do not fall within either category. 136 Moreover,
the Watts holding does not address the broad definition of "property of
the estate" present in 541(a).' 37 Thus, although the Third Circuit pur-
ports to reject an interpretation of the Code that views each section in
"isolation," the decision ironically seems to do just that.
Watts also analogizes unilateral termination by the nondebtor under
these circumstances to a situation in which a party to a contract refuses
to perform because it believes the other party has breached. 3 The court
stated that "in the bankruptcy context, as in other legal contexts, a post-
134. Watts v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Co. (In re Watts), 876 F.2d 1090, 1095 (3d Cir.
1989).
135. Id. at 1096 (quoting In re New Town Mall, 17 B.R. 326, 329 (Bankr. D. S.D.
1982)).
136. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
137. See Watts, 876 F.2d at 1095.
138. See id. at 1096 n.ll.
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hoc challenge suffices to protect relevant interests."' 139 In the bankruptcy
context, however, the stakes are much higher. A debtor's interest in an
executory contract may be its primary asset."a To deprive a debtor of
such an asset-perhaps erroneously-would preclude any chance of a
successful reorganization. 41  Also, in the bankruptcy context, a
nondebtor who incorrectly terminates a contract thinking it is nonassum-
able and nonassignable under section 365(c) or (e)(2) may be liable for
contempt in addition to contract damages. 1
42
B. Exclusionary Theory Should Be Rejected
While the Watts opinion fails to consider sections 365(c) and (e)(2) in
the context of the entire Code and underestimates the delicate nature of a
bankruptcy setting, the court does not address the issue of timing-the
point at which a contract becomes property of the estate for purposes of
the automatic stay. While older cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act
held that a debtor's interest in contract did not become property of the
estate until it was assumed, 143 the trend under the Code has been toward
recognizing immediate vesting upon filing of a petition."
While it never expressly mandated abandonment of the exclusionary
theory,14 Congress defined "property of the estate" very broadly in sec-
tion 541(a) of the Code to include "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor" as of the commencement of the case. 4' Furthermore, the legis-
139. Id& at 1096.
140. See e.g., Abney v. Fulton County, Ga. (In re Fulton Air Serv., Inc.), 34 B.IL 568,
572 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983) (debtor's interest in airport lease was essential to rehabilita-
tion effort).
141. See id.
142. See Computer Communications, Inc. v. Codex Corp. (In re Computer Communi-
cations, Inc.), 824 F.2d 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1987); Walters v. Hatcher (In re Walters), 41
B.R. 511, 516-17; (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984); DePoy v. Kipp (In re DePoy), 29 B.R. 471,
480-81 (N.D. Ind. 1983); Lowry v. McNeil Corp. (In re Lowry), 25 B.L 52, 56-57
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982); Miller v. Savings Bank of Baltimore (In re Miller), 22 B.R. 479,
482 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982); Cusanno v. The Fidelity Bank (In re Cusanno), 17 B.R. 879,
882 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
143. See e.g., Palmer v. Palmer, 104 F.2d 161, 163 (2d Cir.) (lease "does not pass to a
trustee in bankruptcy, unless he adopts it"), cert denied, 308 U.S. 590 (1939); Hall v.
Perry (In re Cochise College Park, Inc.), 703 F.2d 1339, 1352 (9th Cir. 1983) (same);
Commercial Trading Co. v. Lansburgh (In re Garfinkle), 577 F.2d 901, 905 n.5 (5th Cir.
1978) (same).
144. See cases cited supra note 107. But see cases cited supra note 80. The Ninth
Circuit, for example, although adhering to the exclusionary theory in In re Lovitt-a case
decided under the Act--expressly disavowed this position in Computer Communications.
See supra text accompanying notes 121-25.
145. See Andrew, supra note 74, at 20.
146. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988). Section 541(a) "creates an estate" comprised of "all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."
Id. (emphasis added). By contrast, § 70a of the Bankruptcy Act vested the trustee "by
operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing" in the bank-
rupt's property. Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 70a, 52 Stat. 840. Thus, even Professor
Andrew recognizes that the intermediating "title" concepts are rapidly becoming "anti-
quated." See Andrew, supra note 75, at 865.
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lative history indicates that Congress clearly intended the scope of this
paragraph to be very broad. 147 As the court stated in Cohen v. Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group,
Inc.), 14s "The plain language of 541 sweeps in every kind of prepetition
interest of the debtor in property not expressly excepted. Nothing in the
Code suggests that some kinds of interests lurk in limbo outside the es-
tate until assumed." 14
9
In the area of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court has held
that the plain meaning is conclusive unless it would yield a result con-
trary to the intent of the drafters. 5 ° Here, the plain language encom-
passes interests in potentially nonassumable executory contracts.
Applying the stay in these instances to prevent unilateral termination
does not undermine the goals of the Code. A nondebtor may obtain re-
lief from the stay by showing the applicability of section 365(c) or (e)(2)
to the contract. 5 ' Thus, a debtor's interest in an executory contract
should vest in the property of the estate upon filing of a petition. This
interpretation comports with the plain language of the statute without
undermining the intent of Congress.
In addition to section 541(a), the language of section 541(c) also sup-
ports the conclusion that a debtor's interest in a contract vests upon filing
despite the potential applicability of section 365(c) or (e)(2).' 5 2 Section
541(c) provides that a debtor's interest in property becomes "property of
the estate" despite "any provision in an agreement, transfer instrument,
or applicable nonbankruptcy law" that restricts assignability or that is
"conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor."' 53
This language clearly indicates that section 541(c) supersedes state and
federal laws that restrict assignability of contracts. As such, contractual
interests that fall within the purview of sections 365(c) and (e)(2) as a
result of such laws, still become property of the estate upon filing of the
petition.
C. Public Policy
Invoking the automatic stay to prevent unilateral termination in these
instances also promotes the goal of debtor rehabilitation while imposing
only a minimal burden on nondebtors. Considering the case law sup-
porting the notion that Congress intended sections 365(c) and 365(e)(2)
to be narrow exceptions to the general rule, 15 4 the automatic stay merely
147. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
148. 138 B.R. 687, 702 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
149. Id.; see also Westbrook, supra note 76, at 324 ("The exclusionary analysis requires
us to ignore the language and the structure of the Code.").
150. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
152. See Computer Communications, Inc. v. Codex Corp. (In re Computer Communi-
cations, Inc.), 824 F.2d 725, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1987).
153. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (1988).
154. See Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Thomas B. Hamilton Co. (In re Thomas B. Ham-
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protects against an erroneous termination. It requires that the section
365(c) or (e)(2) determination be made by the court after adequate notice
and a full hearing.1 5 Also, the stay does not permanently prohibit the
nondebtor from terminating an executory contract. 56 A nondebtor may
obtain relief from the stay by showing the applicability of section 365(c)
or (e)(2) to an executory contract.'5 7 Moreover, the stay is primarily
designed to provide the debtor with a "breathing spell" so it can attempt
to rehabilitate itself.'5 ' During this period the debtor may reevaluate his
situation and possibly offer the nondebtor valuable concessions.159
In general, nondebtors in a bankruptcy proceeding are similar to those
people standing in line at a bakery. That is, if they remain patient and
stay in line, they will receive their fair share of the cake. If, however,
they cut the line and run to the front, the orderly distribution process
employed by the bakery will eventually be destroyed. As the court in In
re Cardinal Industries, Ina"6 eloquently summarized it,
It is important that all parties impacted by a bankruptcy filing recog-
nize that reorganization in bankruptcy is a collective process. If a few
rush to grab what only arguably is theirs and others follow suit, those
who have more carefully observed the law or have given the legal rem-
edy an opportunity to work are hurt. And the collective nature of the
remedy is destroyed. That approach is antithetical to the legal process.
Even though parties may not want to be involuntarily involved in a
ilton, Co.), 115 B.R. 384, 387 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990), aff'd, 969 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir.
1992); Secretary of the Army v. Terrace Apartments, Ltd. (In re Terrace Apartments,
Ltd.), 107 B.R. 382, 384 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989); In re Lile, 103 B.R. 830, 838-39
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989); Wegner Farms Co. v. Merchants Bonding Co. (In re Wegner
Farms Co.), 49 B.R. 440,445 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985); Abney v. Fulton County, Ga. (In
re Fulton Air Serv., Inc.), 34 B.R1 568, 571-72 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983).
155. See In re Rooster, Inc., 100 B.R. 228, 233 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); Wegner Farms
Co. v. Merchants Bonding Co. (In re Wegner Farms), 49 B.R. 440, 445 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1985). The stay enables a court of law, with all facts and circumstances at its
disposal, to decide whether an executory contract falls within the purview of § 365(c) or
(e)(2). See Government Nat'l Mortgage Corp. v. Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (In re
Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc.), 12 B.R. 977, 983 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). Requiring a
hearing with all interested parties present also effectuates the goals of the Code by ensur-
ing a fair and orderly resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings.
156. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, supra note 3, at 341, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6297; S. Rep. No. 989, supra note 16, at 50, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5836.
157. See In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 983 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); Gov-
ernment Nat'l Mortgage Corp. v. Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (In re Adana Mortgage
Bankers, Inc.), 12 B.R. 977, 984 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
158. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, supra note 3, at 341, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6296-97; S. Rep. No. 989, supra note 16, at 50, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5836.
Congress also intended the stay as a means to protect creditors by preventing "[a] race of
diligence" that would enable "[t]hose who acted first [to] obtain payment of the claims in
preference to and to the detriment of other creditors." H.R. Rep. No. 595, supra note 3,
at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297; S. Rep. No. 989, supra note 16, at 49,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5835.
159. See Wegner Farms Co. v. Merchants Bonding Co. (In re Wegner Farms Co.), 49
B.R. 440, 445 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985).
160. 116 B.R. 964 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
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bankruptcy proceeding, that fact does not affect the Court's duty to
insure that the bankruptcy laws are properly interpreted and
implemented. 161
As this reasoning indicates, bankruptcy is a collective process, the goal of
which is to prevent any one creditor from exacting more than its fair
share of the estate. Allowing a nondebtor to unilaterally terminate a con-
tract would circumvent this process. 162
CONCLUSION
Legislative intent, statutory interpretation, and public policy all point
toward the application of the automatic stay to prevent unilateral termi-
nation of contracts falling within the purview of sections 365(c) and
(e)(2). The stakes in bankruptcy are high and, in many cases, a debtor's
interest in an executory contract is its most valuable asset. An erroneous
termination of the contract may destroy any opportunity that the debtor
had for a successful rehabilitation. The stay protects against such a ter-
mination by providing the debtor with a temporary "breathing spell,"
thereby giving the debtor a chance to regroup and develop a plan of reha-
bilitation. Depending on the nature of the contract and its significance to
any effort at rehabilitation, the debtor may also use this opportunity to
offer more favorable terms to a nondebtor.
Since the stay provision of section 362 is not permanent and may be
lifted for cause, it strikes an equitable balance between a debtor's goal of
rehabilitation and a nondebtor's right to receive the full benefit of its
bargain. It gives the debtor an opportunity to reorganize while not im-
posing an undue burden on a nondebtor. Accordingly, this approach re-
flects an interplay between sections 362 and 365 that achieves a primary
goal of the Bankruptcy Code in a very efficient manner.
161. Id. at 971.
162. See id.
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